



State mandatory collective bargaining laws can mean public
employees are more likely to participate in politics.
In many states, Republican Governors have moved to end collective bargaining rights for public
employees, with the aim of curtailing their ability to mobilize politically. In new research covering
34 states with mandatory collective bargaining laws, Patrick Flavin and Michael T. Hartney find
that these laws can have a large effect on the likelihood that public employees will participate in
politics. They say that with the rise of new laws to prevent collective bargaining for state
employees, the membership and influence of labor unions is likely to decline.
On July 31, 2014, the Wisconsin Supreme Court upheld Republican Governor Scott Walker’s
2011 Budget Repair Bill that severely curtailed collective bargaining rights for the state’s public
employees. While most of the debate in Wisconsin – and other states experiencing similar labor
policy retrenchment – has focused on the economic consequences such as government
spending and worker wages, the effects of collective bargaining laws on labor union political
mobilization may be even more significant. Indeed, the fact that Walker’s legislation weakened
bargaining rights for public employees whose unions have historically been strong supporters of
the Democratic Party (e.g., teachers and state, county, and municipal employees) while leaving
the state’s more Republican-friendly police and firefighter unions intact suggests that political elites are well aware
that collective bargaining and other advantageous labor laws help subsidize the political mobilization operations
of union interest groups. Just how instrumental have public sector collective bargaining laws been for union
efforts to mobilize their supporters in politics?
To answer this question, we examined data on the political participation of public school teachers from 1956 to
2004. During this time period, 34 states adopted mandatory collective bargaining laws for teachers which allowed
us to compare the political activity of teachers before and after their unions operated with the benefit of a public
sector collective bargaining law. Substantively, we found that the effect of a teacher working in a mandatory
bargaining law environment is greater than the effect of a teacher’s household income, education, and union
membership status on her likelihood of participating in politics. We also identify increased contact from organized
groups (i.e. teacher unions) seeking to mobilize teachers as a likely explanation for this finding.
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What specifically about collective bargaining laws helped catalyze political participation among teachers? The
onset of collective bargaining in the public sector conferred an assortment of benefits (often formal and
contractual) to teacher unions at the organizational level, benefits that in turn made it easier and less costly for
unions to focus on recruiting rank-and-file employees to participate in politics. To mention just two small
examples: it is quite common in mandatory bargaining law states to find contracts that guarantee teachers unions
the equivalent of congressional franking privileges through unlimited use of the school district’s internal mail
service. Moreover, many of these same contracts also subsidize the local union president’s salary so she can
focus her efforts on union business. In other words, many school districts effectively pay for the equivalent of a
full-time political activist for the head of the local teacher union interest group.
Our findings speak directly to the growing debate in the United States about the costs and benefits of public
sector collective bargaining. Traditionally, unions have been relied upon as an antidote to upper-class bias in
American politics, with many pointing to the decline of unions as a major factor in the growth of representational
inequalities between the working class and economic elites. With the recent passage of laws in several states
that curtail collective bargaining for public employees, it is likely that membership and the political influence of
labor unions will decline even further.
On the other hand, critics of public employee unions argue that they are the ultimate special interest group –
uniquely advantaged in the public policymaking process by being afforded “two bites at the apple.” That is, public
sector unions are able to lobby elected officials at both the ballot box and the (collective) bargaining table. For
those who believe public employee unions have widely contributed to the current fiscal crises (e.g., pension
obligations) facing many state and local governments around the nation, our finding that these two bites at the
apple (collective bargaining and political activism) work in concert with one another will likely confirm opponents’
convictions that the time to rein in government subsidies to public employee unions is long overdue.
Irrespective of how one views these findings from a normative perspective, however, they offer a useful reminder
that the laws governments enact can have enduring and often unanticipated implications for interest group
organization, citizens’ political participation, and, ultimately, the distribution of political power across society.
This article is based on the paper “When Government Subsidizes Its Own: Collective Bargaining Laws as Agents
of Political Mobilization” in the American Journal of Political Science.
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